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Abstract  The  intent  of  Congress  in  adapting  these
The  1985  Farm  Bill  departs  from  recent  provisions  is  somewhat  difficult  to ascertain.
farm bills in moving toward more restrictive  One objective of limited cross-compliance may
acreage  control.  The  change from a two- to a  have been to eliminate  the creation  of "phan-
five-year  average in calculating  base  acreage  tom  acres,"  acres  which  are  designated  for
and  enforcement  of limited  cross-compliance  conservation  use in compliance  with program
appear to significantly alter crop mix decisions  provisions  for  one  crop  and  then planted  in
on representative Alabama cotton farms.  another program crop, such as sorghum. Lim-
ited cross-compliance  could  also be important
Key words:  farm  programs,  base  acreage,  in cases where  an anticipated large  supply of
limited cross-compliance.  one  commodity results  in  a high-acreage  re-
YUTn  t  f  poa  t  90  duction  requirement.  In  such  a case,  a  pro-
Unlike  the  farm  programs  of  the  1970s  ducer  might be tempted to elect  for nonpar-
which allowed price signals to be the primary  ticipation in that commodity and plant beyond
determinant  of acreage,  even  for farm  pro-  the base, thus  exacerbating the existing sup-
gram crops, the 1981 and  1985 Farm Bills lim-  ply problem.  Limited  cross-compliance,  how-
ited farm program crop acreage to a portion of  ever,  provides  a  disincentive,  particularly  if
an historical average. Although the 1985 Farm  program provisions for other commodities are
Bill  does  not  represent  a radical  departure  favorable.  The  five-year  base  provision  may
from the 1981 Farm Bill, the 1985 bill is more  also have been designed to stabilize supply.
restrictive than the 1981  bill. Under the  1981  The objective of this study is to analyze how
Farm  Bill,  a  two-year  average  was  used  to  the change in base acreage calculation and the
calculate  the  program  base.  The  two-year  enforcement  of limited cross-compliance  affect
average  base,  although  reducing  flexibility  producers'  farm  program  participation,  crop
relative  to  the  previous  program,  was  not  mix decisions,  and income  under the hypothe-
entirely rigid. To expand  base acreage  under  sis of profit maximization.  To accomplish  this
the 1981  Farm  Bill, the producer had  only to  objective,  five-year  mixed-integer  program-
forego  one or  two years  of the  economically  ming models  of representative  Alabama  cot-
attractive farm program benefits.  Under the  ton farms were developed. The effects of these
1985 Farm Bill, however,  base  acreage calcu-  farm program provisions were tested for the
lation uses  a five-year  average.  This  makes  representative farms.
it  significantly  more  difficult  for  producers  Cotton was selected as the commodity of in-
to expand  base  acreage  and  modify  planting  terest  for two reasons. First, cotton has long
patterns.  been  an important farm program  commodity
The  limited  cross-compliance  provision  of  in most southern  states, and, in Alabama,  cot-
the  1985  Farm Bill  further limits  producers'  ton  typically  ranks  first  among  major  row
abilities  to  change  crop  mix.  Under  limited  crops  in terms  of cash receipts  to producers
cross-compliance,  a producer who opts to par-  (Alabama  Agricultural  Statistical  Service).
ticipate  in  the  government  program  for any  Secondly, farm program provisions historically
one  crop  may  not plant  more  than the  base  have had important effects  on cotton acreage
acreage  of any  other program  crop,  even  if  (Duffy and Knutson).
there is no program participation  for the sec-
ond crop.
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85REVIEW OF LITERATURE RVIEW  OF LITERATURE  areas  of  the  state,  together  accounting  for
Although Heady recognized  as early as 1948  more than 70 percent of Alabama's cotton pro-
that government program provisions influence  duction (Alabama Crop and Livestock Report-
crop  mix decisions,  it was not until  1972 that  ing Service). However, the two regions of Ala-
Scott and Baker included government program  bama are dissimilar in soil type, topology, and
provisions in a quadratic programming model  climate, justifying consideration of each region
of  a  central  Illinois  cash  grain  farm.  In the  separately.
1970s,  farm program participation resulted in  Based  on Alabama Farm Analysis  Associa-
lower expected  profits than nonparticipation.  tion records, the central farm was assumed to
Their analysis,  therefore,  examined the  risk-  have  913 acres suitable for row crops and  186
income  trade-off  of  participation  and  non-  acres suitable for a cow-calf operation, and the
participation.  Several  subsequent  studies  farmer was assumed  to begin with a 474-acre
(Persaud and Mapp; Kramer and Pope; Musser  base in cotton,  a 36-acre base in wheat, and a
and  Stamoulis) also  analyzed  the risk-income  54-acre  base  in corn. Also  based on  Alabama
trade-off for participation and nonparticipation.  Farm Analysis Association records, the north-
More recently, participation in the farm pro-  west farm was assumed to have 948 acres suit-
gram has been designed to increase  expected  able for row-crops and  56 acres  suitable for a
income as well as to reduce risk. In most years,  cow-calf operation.  The farmer was  assumed
the only benefit  from not participating  in the  to begin with a 492-acre cotton base, a 38-acre
farm  program  would  be  the  opportunity  to  wheat base, and a 56-acre corn base. Although
change planting patterns and increase the base  these  farms  are  well  above  the  median  for
of a profitable  crop for increased  future  pro-  Alabama  in acreage,  they are representative
gram benefits.  of the commercial size farms in the state.
Perry used quadratic  programming  to ana-  In Table  1, some further assumptions  con-
lyze  the  participation/crop-mix  decision  for  cerning expected prices and yields for the crop
Texas  crop  farms  and  found  that  under  the  and livestock enterprises are presented. Prices
1981  Farm  Bill  farmers  were  willing  to exit  and yields are the actual 1986 prices and yields
the  program  for  one  or  two  years  to  adjust  taken from the Alabama Farm Analysis Asso-
planting  patterns.  The  greater  the  assumed  ciation records.
degree of risk aversion, the greater the likeli-  Five-year mixed-integer programming  mod-
hood  of  participation  in  the  farm  program.  els  of the  two  farms  were  developed.  (For
With  a five-year  base, participation  occurred  a  discussion  of  integer  programming,  see
every year and no adjustments took place.  McMillan.) A five-year planning horizon, rather
than a longer  one, was selected for this study
;METHODS  because of considerable uncertainty about the
Two  representative  Alabama  farms  were  long-run direction of farm programs. When the
created using 1985 and  1986 records from the  current  farm bill  expires, there is no guaran-
Alabama Farm Analysis Association and  1986  tee that base acreage  will still be relevent.  A
budgets  from  the  Alabama  Cooperative  Ex-  longer planning horizon, with an assumed con-
tension  Service.  Although the representative  tinuation of the base acreage provisions of the
farms are diversified crop and livestock farms,  current Farm Bill, would probably provide in-
the primary commodity,  as defined by the pro-  creased incentives to expand the bases of the
ducers,  is cotton.  Although  cotton is the  pri-  more profitable crops.
mary commodity of interest in this analysis, it  The models include detailed  representation
is important to consider  cross-commodity  im-  of farm program provisions. The target price/
pacts  of the program.  In Alabama,  most  cot-  deficiency  payment  program  provides  direct
ton farms include alternative enterprises,  and  payments  to producers.  The total  deficiency
the interaction of farm program provisions for  payment is found by multiplying the per-unit
cotton  and other  commodities  can  be  an  im-  deficiency  payment  by  proven  yield  and  eli-
portant  determinant  of cotton  acreage.  Be-  gible acreage.  In this study, proven yield was
cause  the  wheat,  cotton,  and  corn programs  assumed equal to actual yield. Although in any
are  similar in  design,  analysis  of the  cotton  given year proven  yield may vary considera-
program in a multi-crop setting is important.  bly  from  actual  yield,  their  average  values
One representative farm was developed for  would be  approximately  equal  if yields  were
the central region of Alabama and another for  not trending sharply  upwards or downwards.
the northwest region. Central  and northwest  (See Stucker and Collins for details of the farm
Alabama  are  the  major  cotton-producing  program.)
86Plantings  of farm program commodities  are  that planted  and  considered  planted  acreage
limited by base acreage and any required acre-  for  each  year prior  to  the  first year  of the
age reduction.  Although a payment limitation  analysis  was  equal to the beginning base.  In
provision  can be enforced in the model, it was  the present example, not all of the TBASE-4
not included  in this analysis  because  farmers  row is presented due to space limitations.
can use  legal  organization  to evade  the pay-  The row TFCOT transfers program and non-
ment  limitation  provision  (U.S.  General  Ac-  program acreage  alike to total yield for calcu-
counting Office).  lating  market  receipts.  TPCOT  transfers
Integer variables were used to provide mu-  proven  yield from the program acres  for cal-
tual  exclusivity  of participation  and  nonpar-  culating deficiency  payments.  An initial  defi-
ticipation  in  the  farm  program  for  each  eli-  ciency payment on all production is calculated
gible  crop.  Participation  vs.  nonparticipation  in row DEFPAY. (There is a $.2715 per-pound
for each crop in each year required a separate  cotton  deficiency  payment  in  the  example.)
pair of 0-1 integers. The sum of each pair was  This deficiency  payment  is then  divided into
constrained  to  equal  one.  Thus,  only  one  of  DPAYK, which the farm operator keeps, and
each set of integers could enter the solution.  DPAYX, which is excess beyond the payment
In our study, the  assumed  objective  of the  limitation.  In this  example, there  is a $50,000
producers was profit maximization.  Thus, the  payment  limit  in  effect.  To  nullify  the  pay-
producers  were  assumed  to  be  risk  neutral,  ment limit  (as  has been done  in the  applica-
and participation  vs.  nonparticipation  in  the  tion), the right-hand  side of PAYLIM can be
farm program was evaluated  solely in terms  increased until it is not binding.
of expected  profits. 1 A  risk-averse  producer  Other features  of the model, not presented
would  probably  be  less  likely  than  a  risk-  in Figure 1, are quarterly cash flow transfers,
neutral producer to stay out of the farm pro-  graduated income taxes, and family living ex-
gram for one or more years in the hope of in-  penditure as a function of income. In the model,
creasing future profits.  each year's financial activities are represented
A small portion of the central farm model is  in four accounting periods.  Variable costs are
presented  in Figure 1. In this example, there  charged  to  the  period in  which  they are  in-
is  a  five-year  base  and  no  cross-compliance,  curred.  Borrowing  is  allowed  at a  quarterly
limited  or  otherwise.  The  integer  variables  rate of three percent,  and excess cash  can be
X-3  and  Y-3  represent  nonparticipation  and  invested at two percent quarterly.
participation, respectively, in year 3.  Production costs used in the model are from
The FAL row prohibits planting outside the  1986 Alabama Cooperative Extension  Service
program if X-3 is not  selected, and PAL pro-  enterprise budgets for the central  and north-
hibits program  acreage if Y-3 is not selected.  west regions. For the central farm, fixed costs
If X-3 is selected, its coefficient is sufficiently  are assumed to be $94,852  per year based on
large  that FAL is nonbinding and other  con-  1986 Alabama Farm Analysis Association rec-
straints  in  the  model  (land,  labor,  etc.)  will  ords.  Of the  fixed  costs, interest  charged  to
limit  nonprogram  cotton  acreage  (AFC).  If  fixed assets equals  $44,865.  Annual  deprecia-
Y-3 is selected, BASEL-3 limits program acre-  tion  for machinery  and  buildings  is  $35,290.
age  (APC)  to the  base  (BASE-3).  The rows  For  the  northwest  farm,  fixed  costs  equal
ARP and PLIM  divide  program acreage into  $115,487 per year of which $58,922 is for inter-
planted acreage  (PLAC) and mandatory idled  est and $27,875  is for depreciation.  Deprecia-
acreage  (ACRP).  In this  example, 25 percent  tion  is  calculated  using  the  straight-line
of the base must be idled.  method to avoid large year-to-year changes in
Cotton  base  in  year  4  is  calculated  in  the  fixed costs.  Fixed costs are charged  on an an-
TBASE-4  row.  It is the  average  of program  nual basis at the end of each year.
and nonprogram  acreage  (APC and AFC) for  Progressive federal  and state income taxes
five years, years 1, 2,  and 3  of the model plus  are  calculated  at  the  end  of  each  year
a presumed  average from the years before the  (Vandeputte  and  Baker).  Marginal  tax rates
model begins.  In this analysis, it was assumed  are from actual 1985 state and federal income
'Empirical  evidence indicates that while the hypothesis  of risk aversion  is valid  for some producers,  it is not valid  for all (Lin et al.;
Knowles; Wilson).  Thus, the  choice  of objective function, strict profit maximization  vs. a modification  to account  for risk, depends on the
objective of the study.  In this study, we wish to determine,  among other things, how  changes in the  farm program affect  the producers'
ability to generate income,  hence profit maximization  was used.
87Rows  X-3  Y-3  AFC  APC  DPAYK  DPAYT  DPAYX  PCOT  PLAC  ACRP  SLCT  BASE3  BASE4  LEVEL
PROG  1  1  <  1
BASEL-3  1  -1  <  0
PLIM  .75  -1  =  0
FAL  -1000  1  <  0
PAL  -1000  1  <  0
ARP  .25  -1  =  0
DEFPAY  1  -.2715  =  0
TPAYLM  -1  1  -1  =  0
PAYLIM  1  <  50,000
TBASE-4  -. 2  -. 2  1  =  190
TBASE-5  -. 2  -. 2  =  94.8
TFCOT  -552  -552  1  <  0
TPCOT  1  -552  <  0
INTRAN  307.99  -1  307.99  -. 5225  =  0
Rows
ARP-i  Cotton  Acreage  Reduction  Requirement  Row For The  Ith Year
BASEL-i  Cotton Base Limit Transfer  Row For The Ith Year
DEFPAY-i  Cotton Deficiency Payment For The  Ith Year
FAL-i  Cotton  Nonprogram  Acreage Limit For The Ith Year
INTRAN-i  Income Transfer Row  For The Ith Year
PAL-i  Cotton  Program  Acreage Limit For The  Ith Year
PAYLIM-i  Payment Limitation  For All Program  Crops For The  Ith Year
PLIM-i  Cotton  Planted Acreage  Limit For  The Ith Year
PROG-i  Program Row For Cotton  For The  Ith Year
PTAXT-i  Tax Paying Accounting Row For  The Ith Year
TBASE-i  Cotton  Base Transfer Row For  The Ith Year
TFCOT-i  Nonprogram Cotton  (Free  Market)  Transfer Row For The  Ith Year
TPAYLM-i  Cotton  Payment Limitation Transfer Row  For The Ith Year
TPCOT-i  Program Cotton Transfer Row For The  Ith  Year
Variables
ACRP-i  Cotton  Acreage  Reduction Requirement Accounting Activity For The  Ith Year
AFC-i  Nonprogram (Or  Free  Market) Cotton  Acreage  For  The Ith Year
APC-i  Program Cotton  Acreage  For The Ith Year
BASE-i+1  Cotton Base  For The Next Year
DPAYK-i  Cotton Deficiency Payment That The Operator Keeps
DPAYT-i  Cotton  Deficiency Payment Transfer Activity For The Ith Year
DPAYX-i  Cotton Deficiency Payment In  Excess Of The Limitation For The  Ith Year
DUMC-i  Dummy Consumption  For  The Ith Year
PCOT-i  Program  Cotton  For The  Ith Year
PLAC-i  Planted Program  Cotton  Acreage  For  The Ith Year
SLCT-i  Cotton Selling Activity For  The Ith Year
X-i  0-1  Integer For  Nonprogram  Cotton  For The Ith  Year
Y-i  0-1  Integer For  Program  Cotton  For The  Ith Year
Figure 1. Representative  Farm Model Matrix  of Cotton Government  Program Provisions, Central Alabama.
88tax tables. The operator is assumed to be mar-  in  expected  prices  or  yield,  might  cause  the
ried, filing  a joint return, with two  other de-  farmer to modify the plan.
pendents.  The second case is identical to the first ex-
Farm family consumption expenditures  are  cept that the base  acreage is changed  from a
calculated  each year as a portion  of after-tax  two- to a five-year average. This case is simi-
income.  A minimum consumption  of $10,000 is  lar to current farm programs except that lim-
specified,  and  a marginal  propensity  to con-  ited cross-compliance  is not enforced.  In this
sume  of .43  (Richardson  and  Nixon)  is  used  case,  the  effect  of moving  from  a  two- to  a
for income  above  this  amount.  If there  is in-  five-year base is isolated.
sufficient  income  for the minimum  consump-  The third case uses a two-year base and lim-
tion,  cash may be withdrawn  from savings  or  ited cross-compliance.  The purpose of this trial
borrowed.  is  to  analyze  how  limited  cross-compliance
The  operator  is assumed  to work  full time  alone  would  have  affected  planting patterns
on the farm.  Based  on Alabama Farm Analy-  without the complication of the five-year base.
sis Association records, the central farm is as-  Comparison  of the results from the second and
sumed to have  additional unpaid family  labor  third  cases  should  provide  an  indication  of
equivalent to a one-third-time person, and the  which  provision  is  most  limiting.  Finally,
northwest  farm  is  assumed  to have  an  addi-  both  the  five-year  base  and  limited  cross-
tional  three-fourths-time  person.  Labor  re-  compliance  are added.
quirements are specified  on a quarterly basis.  Results  of these  analyses  are presented  in
Additional  labor  may  be  hired  at  $4.50  per  Table  2 for the central  farm  and  Table  3  for
hour. All employment contracts, whether full-  the northwest farm. The results indicate that
or part-time, must run for an entire year.  both the five-year base and the limited cross-
The  objective  function  is  maximization  of  compliance  provisions  have important  effects
total  cash  (including investment  balances)  at  on the farm plan.
the  end  of the  fifth  year.  Taxes  and  family  Even  under  the  most  flexible  alternative
consumption  are  deducted  in  each  year,  but  (a  two-year  base  and  no  limited  cross-
opportunity costs of operator  time are not in-  compliance),  the  central farm  is  not a profit-
eluded.  Because  acreage  and  machinery  val-  able venture.  Net worth  decreases  by more
ues remain fixed throughout  the planning ho-  than  $240,000  over  the  five-year  horizon.  In
rizon,  the  objective  function  is  equivalent  to  this analysis, the producer plants as much pro-
maximizing after-tax ending net worth.  gram  cotton  as  allowed  in  each  year  (474
acres). By not participating in the wheat pro-
RESULTS  gram for the first two years, the producer ex-
Several policy alternatives were evaluated.  pands  the  wheat base  to  439  acres  by  year
The first case uses the assumptions presented  three. Then, in years three through five, there
in  Table  1, a  two-year  base  and  no  cross-  is program participation for wheat.4
compliance.  This represents a "flexible" alter-  For  the  five-year  base  with  no  cross-
native to the current farm program provisions  compliance  on the  central  farm, the planting
concerning acreages of program crops. Target  decisions in years  one and two are identical to
prices, market prices, and production costs are  the previous case. In years three through five,
held  constant  in  every  year of the  planning  however,  wheat  acreage  is  reduced  because
horizon. In reality, these factors would fluctu-  the  five-year  base  calculation  results  in  a
ate  over  time.  At the  beginning  of the plan-  smaller base. Losses increase to $267,681. The
ning horizon, however,  future values of these  switch from a two-year to a five-year base thus
variables  are unknown.  Results in this analy-  "costs" this producer $26,945.
sis thus represent the first year of a five-year  For the  two-year  base  with  limited  cross-
plan that the farmer would begin in the first  compliance  for  the  central  farm,  results  are
year  of the  planning  horizon.  In  subsequent  dramatically  different  than  for  either  of
years,  new  information,  particularly  changes  the  previous  cases.  Because  limited  cross-
2Changes in the tax laws, occurring after model development, resulted in a different rate structure. Sensitivity analysis indicated that
major decision variables were unaffected by tax rates; hence,  the  1985 rates were not changed. As farm growth is not an alternative  in
the model, tax considerations are not of great importance here.
3In the  1985 Farm Bill, base is the lowest  of a two-year or a five-year average.  In this paper, we  opted to isolate  the effects of a pure
five-year base. In developing the next farm bill, policy makers may very well consider this option as the five-year base will, by then, have
been in effect long enough  so that there would be no unanticipated base gains  from such a policy.
4Rotational restrictions are not used in the model because many Alabama farms are not following a rotational  system (Touchton et al.).
89TABLE  1.  SUMMARY  OF  PRICES, LOAN  RATES, TARGET PRICES, ACREAGE  REDUCTION  REQUIREMENTS,
YIELDS,  AND BASE  ACREAGE  FOR THE  CENTRAL  AND NORTHWEST  ALABAMA  COTTON  FARMS,
ALABAMA FARM ANALYSIS  ASSOCIATION,  1985 AND  1986
Farm  and  Acreage reduction
enterprise  Price  Loan rate  Target price  requirement  Yields  Base acreage
($/unit)  ($/unit)  ($/unit)  (%)  (unit/acre)  (acres)
Central farm
Cotton  .49/lb  .5225/lb  .794/lb  25.0  552 Ibs  474
Wheat  2.02/bu  2.28/bu  4.38/bu  27.5  29 bus  36
Corn  2.98/bu  1.82/bu  3.03/bu  20.0  54 bus  54
Soybeans  4.97/bu  - -29  bus
Double-cropped  4.97/bu  - - 27 bus
Soybeans
Cow-calf  .48/lb  - - 577 lbs
Northwest farm
Cotton  .53/lb  .5225/lb  .794/lb  25.0  726 Ibs  492
Wheat  2.95/bu  2.28/bu  4.38/bu  27.5  36 bus  38
Corn  2.09/bu  1.82/bu  3.03/bu  20.0  89 bus  56
Soybeans  5.18/bu  - - -28  bus
Double-cropped  5.18/bu  - - - 27 bus
Soybeans
Cow-calf  .48/lb  - 577 Ibs
compliance prohibits participation in any farm  cross-compliance  less "costly" to the producer
program if one crop is planted beyond the base,  than the five-year base.
it is  not  possible  to  expand  the  wheat  base  The final policy  alternative  for the central
while  participating  in  the  cotton  program.  farm  is  a five-year  base  with limited  cross-
Rather than restrict wheat acreage  over the  compliance.  The strategy evaluated is similar
five-year  horizon,  in  this  case  the  producer  to that employed in the two-year base/limited
would  opt  out  of the  farm  program  for one  cross-compliance  scenario. The  entire acreage
year and  plant  the  entire acreage  in double-  is planted to nonprogram  wheat-soybeans  in
cropped  wheat-soybeans.  After this, program  year one, and subsequent  acreages  are deter-
cotton  and  wheat  (double-cropped  with  soy-  mined by the maximum  allowable  wheat and
beans)  are  planted  to the  maximum  allowed  cotton  under farm program  participation.  In
under  the  farm program  and  single-cropped  this  case,  losses  total  $290,760,  considerably
soybeans utilize the remainder of the cropland.  more  than  in  any  other  policy  alternative.
Five-year  losses  now total  $257,097,  making  Interestingly, the full "costs" of switching to a
90TABLE 2.  CROP MIX AND OBJECTIVE  FUNCTIONS VALUE  FOR  REPRESENTATIVE  CENTRAL ALABAMA
FARM
Year
Cropa  1  2  3  4  5
Acres Planted and Considered  Planted
Two-year  Base and  No Cross-complianceb  Objective Value -$240,736C
Cotton  474  474  474  474  474
Wheat/Soybean  439d
439d  439  439  439
Soybeans  0  0  0  0  0
Corn  0  0  0  0  0
Five-year Base and No Cross-compliance  Objective Value -$267,681
Cotton  474  474  474  474  474
Wheat/Soybean  439d 439d 197  229  268
Soybeans  0  0  242  210  171
Corn  0  0  0  0  0
Two-year  Base and Limited Cross-compliance  Objective Value -$257,097
Cotton  0  237  119  178  148
Wheat/Soybean  913d  475  694  584  639
Soybeans  0  202  101  151  126
Corn  0  0  0  0  0
Five-year Base and Limited  Cross-compliance  Objective Value -$290,760
Cotton  0  379  360  337  311
Wheat/Soybean  913d 211  246  289  339
Soybeans  0  322  306  287  264
Corn  0  0  0  0  0
a  Unless otherwise noted, acreage is  in  farm  program.  Reported  values are total of acreage  planted and considered
planted. For cotton in  the program,  planted  acreage is  75  percent of the total. For wheat in  the program,  planted
acreage is  72.5 percent of the total.
b  The base is  an  arithmetical average of  lagged acreage planted  and considered  planted.  For years prior to the
beginning of the planning  horizon, it  was assumed that  planted and considered planted  acreage equaled the
beginning  base (Table 1).
"  Farm  program  payments can be calculated  by multiplying planted  acres by proven  yield (Table 1)  and the difference
between  target price and market price (Table  1).
d  Represents acreage not in  the farm  program.
91TABLE 3.  CROP MIX AND OBJECTIVE  FUNCTION  VALUES FOR  REPRESENTATIVE  NORTHWEST  ALABAMA
FARM
Year
Cropa 1  2  3  4  5
Acres Planted and Considered  Planted
Two-year Base and  No Cross-complianceb  Objective Value $88,219 c
Cotton  492  492  492  492  492
Wheat/Soybean  456d 456d 456  456  456
Soybeans  0  0  0  0  0
Corn  0  0  0  0  0
Five-year Base and  No Cross-compliance  Objective Value $77,571
Cotton  492  492  492  492  492
Wheat/Soybean  456d 456d 456d 456d 373
Soybeans  0  0  0  72
Corn  0  0  0  0  11
Two-year Base and Limited Cross-compliance  Objective Value $50,410
Cotton  948d 720  834  777  806
Wheat/Soybean  0  19  9  14  12
Soybeans  0  181  91  136  130
Corn  0  28  14  21  0
Five-year Base and Limited Cross-compliance  Objective Value  -$10,194
Cotton  492  492  492  492  492
Wheat/Soybean  38  38  38  38  38
Soybeans  362  362  362  362  362
Corn  56  56  56  56  56
a  Unless otherwise  noted, acreage  is  in  farm  program.  Reported  values are total of acreage planted  and considered
planted.  For cotton in  the program,  planted  acreage is  75 percent of the total. For wheat in  the program,  planted
acreage is  72.5 percent of the total.
b  The base is  an arithmetical  average of lagged  acreage planted  and considered  planted.  For years prior to the
beginning of the planning  horizon, it  was assumed that planted  and considered planted  acreage equaled the
beginning base (Table  1).
c Farm  program  payments can  be calculated  by multiplying planted acres by proven yield (Table  1)  and the difference
between target  price and market  price (Table 1).
d  Represents acreage  not in  the farm  program.
92less flexible acreage  regime  are not  captured  worth decreases by $10,000 over the five-year
by either of the new provisions separately.  horizon. In this scenario, the producer partici-
Crop  mix  and  program  participation  deci-  pates in the government  programs for cotton,
sions on the northwest farm also vary consid-  wheat, and corn in every year of the horizon.
erably  under  the  different  policy  scenarios.  The remaining acreage is planted in soybeans.
With a two-year base and no cross-compliance,
the  strategy is the  same  as the one  selected  CONCLUSIONS
on the central farm for this policy  alternative.
Program  cotton  is  planted  at  the  maximum  Two provisions  of the  1985  Farm Bill were
allowable  level  in all five years.  In years  one  isolated and analyzed: the change from a two-
and two, the farmer opts out of the wheat pro-  to  a  five-year  average  in  calculating  base
gram and plants all the remaining  acreage in  acreage  and  enforcement  of  limited  cross-
double-cropped  wheat and soybeans. In years  compliance. These provisions profoundly affect
three  through  five,  the wheat  acreage  is en-  program participation decisions, the crop-mix,
rolled in the program.  Unlike the central farm,  and  the  profitability  of two  representative
the  northwest  farm  is  a  profitable  venture  Alabama cotton farms.
under  this  alternative.  Net  worth  increases  When the switch from a two-year to a five-
by  more  than  $88,000  in  five  years.  With  a  year  base  was  made  and  limited  cross-
five-year  base  and  no  cross-compliance,  the  compliance  was not enforced, the basic strat-
producer  would still  enroll cotton in the  pro-  egy of the producers  did not change.  Profita-
gram  up  to  the  maximum  allowed  in  every  bility decreased  in each case,  however,  as the
year.  Nonprogram  wheat  would  be  double-  ability  to expand  the  base  of desirable  pro-
cropped with soybeans for four years, and pro-  gram crops was reduced.  On  the other hand,
gram wheat would be double-cropped with soy-  adding  limited  cross-compliance  to  the  two-
beans in year five. This strategy is somewhat  year base models resulted in a complete change
different  from that  employed  on  the  central  of  strategy  on  both  farms.  Limited  cross-
farm  for the  same  policy  alternative.  In this  compliance also resulted in decreased income.
alternative,  net  worth  increases  by  about  When both limited cross-compliance  and the
$77,500 over the five-year horizon. Thus, there  five-year  base  were  used,  profitability  de-
is about  a  $9,500  decline in ending net worth  creased  considerably.  Thus,  the  "costs"  of
caused by switching from a two-year to a five-  switching  to a less-flexible  program  are not
year base.  adequately  captured  by  either  component
When  the two-year  base  is  combined  with  separately.  On  the  central  farm,  the  cross-
limited  cross-compliance,  the northwest farm  compliance/five-year  base  strategy was  simi-
employs  a  strikingly  different  cropping  pat-  lar  to  the  cross-compliance/two-year  base
tern than previously  noted.  In the  first year  strategy. On the northwest farm, however,  an
of the  planning  horizon,  all  crop  acreage  is  entirely different strategy was chosen.
planted in nonprogram cotton. Cotton acreage  This paper has demonstrated that these two
in years two through five is the maximum al-  provisions  have  extremely  important  conse-
lowed  by  the  program.  (The  base  fluctuates  quences  for  cotton  farms.  It  should  also  be
somewhat  because  it  is  a  moving  average.)  noted that on one of the two  farms analyzed,
Program wheat double-cropped with soybeans  even  the  combination  of  limited  cross-
is the maximum allowed in years two through  compliance and a five-year base did not result
five, as is program corn.  The remaining acre-  in  the farmer  simply staying with his  or her
age  is  allocated  to  single-cropped  soybeans.  given bases in every year. Thus, these require-
In this  case,  ending  net  worth  increases  by  ments may  not  be  entirely  effective  in  "fix-
about $50,000, a $38,000 decline from the case  ing"  future  farm  program  acreages.  Policy
in  which there  was  a two-year  base  and  no  makers  should  consider  whether the  loss  in
cross-compliance.  The limited cross-compliance  farmer flexibility is compensated for by a more
provision  alone  is thus  more  "costly"  to this  stable  supply.  This  type  of question  may  be
farm than the change to the five-year base.  best answered using industry-level models.  In
When  both  a  five-year  base  and  limited  addition,  such  models  might  be  used  to  ad-
cross-compliance  are  enforced,  the profitabil-  dress  the  issue  of  resource  use  (or  misuse)
ity of the  farm is completely  eroded  and net  under the alternative provisions.
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